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AN ANALYSIS OF
PRESBYTERIAN &
REFORMED
PUBLISHING COMPANY
v. COMMISSIONER
GARY S. MARX*
In the case of Presbyterian & Reformed Publishing Company v.
Commissioner [hereinafter P&R],' the Third Circuit held that a religious
publishing company qualified as an exempt organization pursuant to sec-
tion 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. The issue in P&R was
whether a profitable taxpayer had a nonsubstantial "commercial pur-
pose" precluding it from exempt status. The Tax Court held that P&R
was nonexempt.2 It relied exclusively upon the objective indicia of a com-
mercial enterprise manifested by the taxpayer. The Third Circuit re-
versed by applying what purported to be a more subjective analysis.'
This paper discusses the test for obtaining section 501(c)(3) status
for a non-profit corporation whose primary activity is the operating of a
trade or business to further an exempt purpose. Part one sets forth the
relevant facts in the P&R case. Part two analyzes the P&R Tax Court
opinion. Part three discusses the Third Circuit's standard. Part four pro-
poses a new test for determining the availability of section 501(c)(3).
* Of Counsel, Asbill Porter Churchill & Nellis, Washington, D.C.; A.B., Washington Univer-
sity, 1975; J.D. Washington & Lee School of Law, 1979; LL.M., Georgetown University Law
Center, 1985.
1 743 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1984).
2 79 T.C. 1070 (1982), rev'd, 743 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1984).
3 See infra notes 95-97.
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I.
FACTS OF THE PRESBYTERIAN & REFORM PUBLISHING CASE
A. Historical Background
P&R was incorporated in 1931 to disseminate the "system of belief
and practice" of the Orthodox Presbyterian Church (OPC). 4 In 1939 the
IRS granted P&R tax-exempt status. The IRS stated: "[Y]our actual ac-
tivities consist of publishing a religious paper. . .devoted to stating, de-
fending and furthering the gospel. Your income is derived from subscrip-
tions, contributions and gifts and is used to defray maintenance and
general operating expenses."'5 Over time, P&R dramatically changed its
activities from publishing a newspaper to publishing numerous commer-
cially successful books.
P&R had always been predominantly a family-run concern, with its
presidency passing in 1953 from Samuel Craig to his son, Charles H.
Craig. Since 1976, Charles Craig's son, Bryce, had also been a full-time
employee and officer of P&R. Although Bryce had a theological degree,
Charles did not."
P&R was not formally affiliated with any organized church. That is,
P&R was not under any legal obligation to follow the directions of any
church or to provide any profits to any church. However, from the begin-
ning, P&R had been closely linked with the OPC. For example, its books
express the views of that church and among the twelve most recent mem-
bers of P&R's Board of Directors, nearly all had a leadership role in the
OPC.7 The OPC's seminary, the Westminster Theological Seminary of
Philadelphia, is to be the recipient of all P&R's assets in case of dis-
solution.8
B. Compensation of Employees
Neither Samuel nor Charles Craig ever received any compensation
from P&R. In addition, P&R received volunteer help in manuscript read-
ing and editing, packing and shipping books, and clerical duties from va-
rious individuals since its inception. However, when Bryce began working
at P&R in 1976, he was compensated. Bryce received salaries from 1976
4 79 T.C. at 1072.
Id. at 1073.
*Id.
Id. at 1074. "Among [twelve] more recent members of the board of directors of P&R,
nearly all had some overt religious affiliation: [four] were, or had been, church pastors, and
[four] were in some way connected with" the Westminster Theological Seminary, an institu-
tion espousing the "reform" doctrine of the OPC. Id.
6 743 F.2d at 151.
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to 1979, inclusive, of $12,000, 13,250, 15,000, and 15,350. While salaries to
other employees had been de minimis during the late 60's and early 70's,
they had risen to almost $60,000 by 1979.1
Although P&R began in the late 1970's to enter into more formal
arrangements, its relationship with its authors was generally quite infor-
mal. Somewhat less than half of P&R's authors received royalties. While
as little as $350.00 in royalty payments were made in 1969, by 1979 roy-
alty payments reached $82,127.00.
C. Decision to Publish a Particular Book
The main criterion P&R uses to decide on a manuscript's publication
is whether the book would make a "worthy contribution. . . to the reform
community." P&R will publish a book which meets its theoretical stan-
dard even if it will not sell many copies. However, if a book will not sell at
all, P&R will reject it. P&R has published and reprinted at least a few
books rejected by other companies because they were too rigid doc-
trinarily or uneconomical. The books of one of P&R's authors, Jay Ad-
ams, consistently sold well.1"
D. Pricing
P&R sets its prices in order to make a profit. Even when P&R sold at
its greatest discount (60% off list), it did not plan to lose money. Gener-
ally, however, its profit margin was less than that of other publishers.11 At
least as early as 1975, P&R donated books to individuals who requested
9 79 T.C. at 1075. The annual amounts paid as salaries (rounded for convenience) are as
follows:
Year Amount Paid
1969 0
1970 0
1971 300.00
1972 549.00
1973 2,285.00
1974 3,409.00
1975 6,988.00 (includes commissions)
1976 $16,197.00
1977 $23,954.00
1978 $35,230.00
1979 $57,597.00
Id.
'0 Id. at 1078.
11 Id. at 1079. There actually was not much evidence of a comparison between P&R's profit
margin and that with commercial publishers. That evidence which was introduced in the
Tax Court showed that while some publishers set a cost ratio of eight (cost ratio equals list
price divided by unit price), P&R's cost ratio was approximately four. Id.
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E. Accumulation of Profits
P&R's publishing operations were initially run out of Samuel Craig's
house and later out of Charles Craig's house. In 1969, the operation was
moved to a garage purchased by Charles Craig and his wife.12 As early as
March 2, 1974, however, P&R informed the IRS that it was accumulating
a surplus for a "building fund" and that it planned to purchase or build
an office and warehouse. This statement was reasserted in nearly all fu-
ture correspondence with the IRS for the years 1975 through 1977. By
1978, P&R had purchased land and constructed a building at a total cost
of $262,914.00. There was also approximately $30,000.00 for equipment to
be used in the publishing operation.
Payment for the new building and improvements were all made out
of the petitioner's retained earnings. Prior to 1969, P&R had made no
profits. In fact, Samuel and Charles Craig sometimes were required to
make donations to P&R just to cover expenses. However, P&R's profits
greatly expanded from 1969 through 1979 with net profits from book sales
reaching approximately $105,000 for both 1975 and 1976." In addition to
these net profits, the taxpayer received some interest income and
contributions."
II.
ANALYSIS OF TAX COURT RULING.
A. Treatment of the Fact that P&R'S Primary Activity was a Trade or
Business
The first issue which the Tax Court faced was the significance of the
fact that P&R's primary activity was the operation of a trade or business.
On this issue, the Tax Court ruled that "the purpose toward which an
organization's activities are directed, and not the nature of the activities
themselves, is ultimately dispositive of the organization's right to be clas-
sified as a [section] 501(c)(3) organization."' 5 The Tax Court relied on its
prior holding in B.S.W. Group Inc. v. Commissioner,16 in which it held:
The fact that petitioner's activity may constitute a trade or business does
Id. at 1075. Charles Craig received rent from P&R sufficient to cover real estate taxes he
personally paid while leaving a modest excess for other expenses. Id. at 1076.
13 Id. at 1077.
" Id. at 1078. The contributions were for the most part nominal. For the years 1973
through 1978, the taxpayer received no contributions. Id. The highest amount of contribu-
tions was $11,785.00 in 1969, the year in which net profit on sales was only $3,000. Id.
79 T.C. tt 1082, citing B.S.W. Group, Inc. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 352, 356-357 (1978).
70 T.C. 352 (1978).
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not, of itself, disqualify it from classification under section 501(c)(3), pro-
vided the activity furthers or accomplishes an exempt purpose [citations
omitted]. Rather, the critical inquiry is whether the petitioner's primary
purpose for engaging in its sole activity is an exempt purpose, or whether its
primary purpose is the nonexempt one of operating a commercial business
producing net profits for petitioner."
In B.S.W., the Tax Court had found nonexempt a taxpayer which was
formed for the purpose of providing consulting services primarily in the
area of rural-related policy and program development where those ser-
vices were sold above cost and were in competition with for-profit
organizations.
1. Whether the Fact That P&R's Sole Activity Was Carrying on Trade
or Business Should Have Precluded an Exemption
The first question raised by the Tax Court's opinion is whether the
"nature" of P&R's activity should have been considered. Arguably, sec-
tion 502 of the Internal Revenue Code precludes the granting of exempt
status to an organization whose sole activity is the operating of a trade
business.
Section 502 provides: "[A]n organization operated for the primary
purpose of carrying on a trade or business for profit shall not be exempt
from taxation under § 501 on the ground that all of its profits are payable
to one or more organizations exempt from taxation under § 501 from tax-
ation." The section was designed to overrule a line of cases holding that
where a corporation operates a trade or business solely for the purpose of
providing income to an exempt organization, the organization operating
the trade or business itself qualifies for exemption. 8 Essentially, these
cases held that since the ultimate purpose of the trade or business was
charitable, the operation of the trade or business did not preclude exempt
status.19 For example, in the pre-section 502 case of Roche's Beach, Inc. v.
Commissioner,20 the Second Circuit court found exempt an organization
7 Id. at 357. The B.S.W. court cited IRS Regulations § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) and 1.501(c)(3)-
1(e)(1) and two court opinions, San Francisco Infant School, Inc. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C.
957 (1978), involving a daycare center, and Monterey Public Parking Corp. v. United
States, 481 F.2d 175 (9th Cir. 1973), involving a downtown parking lot developed as part of
urban renewal. In both court cases, it was established that the taxpayer was not in competi-
tion with a for-profit concern. Arguably, such cases do not support the Tax Court's proposi-
tion that an exempt organization's sole activity can be a trade or business when the organi-
zation competes with commercial enterprises.
" See H.R. REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess. 36, 41 (1950); S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong.,
2nd Sess. 28, 35 (1950).
" Southeastern Fair Ass'n v. United States, 52 F. Supp. 219 (Ct. Cl. 1943). Sand Springs
Home v. Commissioner, 6 B.T.A. 198 (1927).
20 96 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1938).
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which owned a public bathing beach and operated related concession
stands. All the profits of the organization were turned over to a charitable
foundation. The court reasoned that "[tihe destination of the income is
more significant than its source," and therefore the taxpayer's operation
of the trade or business did not preclude exemption." Similarly, in C.F.
Mueller v. Commissioner,22 a macaroni factory which turned all its profits
over to New York University was found exempt.2 Congress' rejection of
such cases arguably indicates that if an organization's sole activity is the
operation of a trade or business, the purpose for which the trade or busi-
ness is operated is irrelevant. Under this rationale, section 501(c)(3) is
available to any organization which is "operated for the primary purpose
of carrying on a trade or business."
The legislative history of section 502, however, indicates that such an
argument overstates Congress' intent. First, section 502 is limited to those
instances where a corporation claims exemption on the basis of another
corporation's exemption. The statutory language implies that if the or-
ganization claims exemption on any other grounds, section 502 is not ap-
plicable. For example, if the organization concerned claimed exemption
because of its own activities, rather than those of an organization to
whom its profits are payable, section 502 cannot be invoked.
Second, section 502 was enacted along with section 511, which pro-
vides for the taxation of the unrelated business income of an otherwise
exempt organization. Under section 511, where an exempt organization
carries on a trade or business furthering an exempt purpose, the unre-
lated business income tax provisions are inapplicable. This indicates that
there is no limit on the amount of related business income which a corpo-
ration can obtain. 24
Third, the cases cited in the legislative history to section 502 all con-
cern those instances where a "feeder" corporation carried on a trade or
business unrelated to the exempt purpose. For example, in discussing sec-
tion 502, on the floor of Congress, Senator George, of Georgia, said:
The House bill subjected to tax the income of so-called "feeder" organiza-
tions. These are organizations whose only activities are the operation of a
business who turn over the income earned to taxes and to organizations.
21 Id. at 778.
22 190 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1951).
2" Id. See also, Lichter Foundation, Inc. v. Welch, 247 F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1957); Boman v.
Commissioner, 240 F.2d 767 (8th Cir. 1957); Willingham v. Home Oil Mill, 181 F.2d 9 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950).
2' The background of the unrelated business income provisions (§§ 511-513) indicate that
they are based upon a desire to pacify competitors of exempt organizations (e.g., for-profit
macaroni factories) rather than to restrict a charity's exempt activities. See K. Eliasberg,
Charity and Commerce, § 501(c)(3) - How Much Unrelated Business Activity? 21 TAx L.
REV. 53 (1965).
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The highly publicized Mueller macaroni factory is in point. Your Commit-
tee has accepted this provision of the House Bill without change.2"
Similarly, the only cases cited in the Senate Report were those in-
volving trade or businesses unrelated to the exempt purpose:
In the area covered by this amendment, there has been litigation as to the
application of such a rule under existing law (c.f. Roche's Beach, Inc. v.
Commissioner, C.C.A. 2, 1938), 96 F.2d 776; Universal Oil Products Com-
pany v. Campbell (C.A. 7, 1950), 181 F.2d 451; Willingham v. Home Oil
Mill (C.A. 5, 1950), 181 F.2d 9; C.F. Mueller Co., 14 T.C. No. 1111/2 (May
25, 1950). The amendment is intended to show clearly what, from its effec-
tive date, the rule is to be, without disturbing the determination in present
litigation with the rule under existing law.2 6
Accordingly, while Section 502 does not characterize the type of busi-
ness it prohibits, i.e., related or unrelated, the legislative history indicates
that it did not intend to tax income from related business activity.
2 7
Thus, if a taxpayer whose primary activity is the operation of trade or
business can prove that its trade or business furthers an exempt purpose,
§ 502 does not preclude exempt status.
2. Examples of Trade or Business
The most extreme example of the Tax Court's acceptance of an or-
ganization's operation of a trade or business occurred in Edward Orton,
Jr. Ceramic Foundation v. Commissioner.2 In Orton, a foundation took
over and operated a testator's pyrometric cone manufacturing business
and applied the profits therefrom to research in the field of ceramic engi-
neering. The cones were priced to bring a profit of 20%. The profits were
used to further research in pyrometrics. The Tax Court found the tax-
payer exempt even though the company was in direct competition with
other cone manufacturers. 29 Similarly, in Monterey Public Parking Corp.
25 96 Cong. Rec. 13274 (1950).
26 S. RaP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess. 116 (1950).
" Eliasberg, supra note 24, at 83.
28 56 T.C. 147 (1971).
" The dissent in Orton would have accepted the § 502 analysis as precluding exemption:
By imposing the tax on unrelated-business income of an otherwise bona fide exempt
charitable organization, Congress attempted to avoid taxing business income derived
from an exempt organization's activities which were necessarily an integrally part of
the organization's exempt functions. Thus, the regulations, which follow the intent of
Congress as reflected in the reports of congressional committees, make explicit that
the sort of activity which is intended to escape the tax is (1) a relatively small-scale
enterprise (in comparison with the organization's charitable activities), (2) which is
integrally related to the performance of the organization's exempt functions, and (3)
which has as its primary purpose the advancement of such exempt functions.
Orton, 56 T.C. at 170 (Raum, J., dissenting).
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v. Commissioner,'3 an exemption was granted to an organization whose
sole activity was the operation of a downtown parking lot. And in San
Francisco Infant School, Inc. v. Commissioner,31 an exception was
granted to a taxpayer whose sole activity was the operation of a day care
center. These cases indicate that under appropriate circumstances busi-
nesses which otherwise appear purely commercial may qualify for
exemption.
B. Treatment of Multiple Purposes
The P&R Tax Court recognized that where an organization engages
in only one activity (i.e., a trade or business) that activity may further
multiple purposes, exempt and nonexempt. Under the literal language of
section 501(c)(3), the corporation is entitled to an exemption only if it is
"exclusively" for exempt purposes. Under this test, any nonexempt pur-
pose would preclude the exemption. However, it has generally been recog-
nized that the term "exclusively" should not be construed to mean
"solely" or "absolutely without exception. 3 2 Thus, the P&R Tax Court
holds that the presence of any substantial nonexempt purpose bars appli-
cability of section 501(c)(3). The Tax Court relied upon language from
the Supreme Court's decision in Better Business Bureau v. United States
to the effect that "[T]he presence of a single [nonexempt] ... purpose, if
substantial in nature, will destroy the exemption regardless of the num-
ber or importance of truly [exempt] . . . purposes."3 3 While Better Busi-
ness Bureau dealt with Social Security taxes, the statutory language in
that case is comparable to the critical language of section 501. In adopt-
ing the Better Business Bureau test, the P&R court followed a substan-
tial line of case authority.3 4
In adopting this test, however, the P&R Tax Court rejected other
authority which phrased the standard in terms of whether an organiza-
tion's primary purpose is exempt or nonexempt. The cases articulating
this approach tend to be ones in which an exemption is upheld. For ex-
SO 481 F.2d 175 (9th Cir. 1973).
31 69 T.C. 957 (1978).
32 See, e.g., Church v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 102, 107 (1978); Industrial Aid for the Blind v.
Commissioner, 73 T.C. 96 (1979); Peoples Translation Service v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 42
(1979); I.R.C. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(e)(1)(1954)(Income Tax Regulations).
33 326 U.S. 279, 283 (1945).
34 Copyright Clearance Center, Inc. v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 793 (1982); Syrang Aero Club,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 717, 722-23 (1980); Christian Manner Int'l, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 71 T.C. 661, 668 (1979); Christian Stewardship Assistance v. Commissioner, 70 T.C.
1037, 1040 (1978); Fides Publishers Ass'n v. United States, 263 F. Supp. 924, 935 (N.D. Ind.
1967); c.. Est of Hawaii v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 1067, 1079 (1979), aff'd, 647 F.2d 170 (9th
Cir. 1981).
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ample, in Industrial Aid to the Blind v. Corhmissioner,35 the Tax Court
held exempt an organization organized to purchase and sell products
manufactured at the Wisconsin Workshop For The Blind, reasoning that
"[aissuming arguendo that petitioner had a dual purpose, to alleviate the
problems of visually handicapped individuals and to engage in the busi-
ness for a profit, the former purpose is primary. '36 Similarly, in Pulpit
Resource v. Commissioner,3 7 the Tax Court held exempt an organization
whose function was the printing of sermons which could be used by min-
isters, priests, rabbis etc., by reasoning that "the critical inquiry is
whether the primary purpose for engaging in the sole activity is the ex-
empt purpose or the nonexempt purpose; whether the nonexempt pur-
pose was primary or merely incidental to the exempt purpose.""a In fact,
the Tax Court has held that a substantial nonexempt activity which is an
integral and inseparable part of an exempt activity does not result in the
denial of the tax exemption.39 There are quite a few decisions in which
taxpayers clearly had more than a de minimis nonexempt purpose but
the exemption was allowed.40
The liberal construction which the tax exemption provisions are gen-
erally entitled support the "primary" test rejected by the P&R court.4 1 In
addition, a strong argument can be made that the Better Business Bu-
reau test relied upon by the P&R court was limited to those instances
where the commercial purpose was clear from the taxpayer's organiza-
tional documents (as was the case in Better Business Bureau).4' However,
two lines of argument support the Tax Court's decision. First, Congress'
choice of the word "exclusively" in section 501(c)(3) by necessity places
some limits on construction. Second, unless courts are willing to distin-
guish Better Business Bureau on the facts, they would appear to be
bound by the Supreme Court's use of the "substantial in nature" test
35 73 T.C. 96 (1979).
30 Id. at 102 n.2.
37 70 T.C. 594 (1978).
" Id. at 610. See also American Institute for Economic Research v. United States, 302 F.2d
394, 398 (1962); Scripture Press Found. v. United States, 152 Ct. Cl. 463, 469 (1961); Elisien
Guild, Inc. v. United States, 412 F.2d 121, 124 (1st Cir. 1969); B.S.W. Group, Inc. Purchas-
ing Center, Inc. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 352 (1978).
" See San Francisco Infant School v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 957, 965-966 (1978).
' See e.g., St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. United States, 374 F.2d 427, 431 (8th Cir. 1967);
Dulles v. Johnson, 273 F.2d 362, 368 (2nd Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 834 (1960);
Seasongood v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 907, 910 (6th Cir. 1955); Kentucky Bar Found. v.
Commissioner, 78 T.C. 921, 923 (1982); Greater United Navajo Dev. Enters. v. Commis-
sioner, 74 T.C. 69, 77-78 (1980), afj'd 672 F.2d 922 (9th Cir 1981): Church v. Commissioner,
71 T.C. 102; 107 (1978).
41 See, e.g., Passaic United Hebrew Burial Ass'n. v. United States, 216 F. Supp. 500, 505
(D.N.J. 1963).
,' See note 97, infra.
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even if public policy would support a more liberal standard. Accordingly,
the P&R Tax Court's holding with regard to the standard to be applied
appears reasonable.' 3
C. The Tax Court's Test For Determining the Taxpayer's "Purpose"
After determining that the issue in cases such as P&R is whether the
taxpayer has substantial commercial "purpose," the Tax Court turned to
the issue of how to determine the taxpayer's true intent. The Tax Court
reasoned that the "purpose" is to be derived from a review of the objec-
tive facts relating to the organization's operation. The P&R Tax Court
held:
Where a nonexempt purpose is not an expressed goal, courts have focused
on the manner in which activities themselves are carried on, implicitly rea-
soning that an end can be inferred from the chosen means. If, for example,
an organization's management decisions replicate those of commercial en-
terprises, it is a fair inference that at least one purpose is commercial, and
hence nonexempt. [I]f this nonexempt goal is substantial, tax-exempt status
must be denied."
Thus, the Tax Court establishes a rule that if an organization operates as
a commercial business it must necessarily have a commercial purpose.
Having decided that the corporation's "purpose" is to be determined on
the basis of objective facts, the issue is what facts are relevant.
1. The Presence of Substantial Profits
The P&R Tax Court held that "among the factors indicating non-
exempt purpose is the presence of substantial profits." As the court notes,
of equal importance is the related factor of a method of pricing the organ-
ization's product (i.e., of the religious publications).
The court reasoned that "we consider it very significant that, gener-
ally speaking, petitioner established prices which not only bring in sizea-
ble profits, but which did so at consistent and comfortable net profit mar-
gins.' 45 The Tax Court was particularly critical of P&R for not lowering
the price of the books of its popular authors in order to increase the ful-
fillment of the organization's exempt purpose of disseminating its reli-
gious beliefs. It further noted that during the period of expansion (1969-
1979) profits peaked at over $105,000 and averaged in the later years ap-
proximately $60,000.46
4 Accord, Copyright Clearance Center v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 789 (1982).
4" 79 T.C. at 82-83.
"' Id. at 1085.
46 71 T.C. 202 (1978). The Aid to Artisans court held:
We are required first to focus on the organization's primary activities and determine
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The Tax Court's focus on profits is consistent with prior precedent.
However, the mere presence of profit is not determinative where the tax-
payer can show that the profits are being used for an exempt purpose. For
example, in Aid to Artisans, Inc. v. Commissioner,47 the Tax Court up-
held an exemption to a corporation organized to promote the handicraft
output of disadvantaged artisans in developing societies of the world. The
Aid to Artisan Court noted that while the taxpayer's products were sold
to make profits, the profits were spent in furthering the corporation's ex-
empt purpose. Thus, according to the court, there was no "commercial
purpose."
Similarly, in Edward Orton, Jr., Ceramic Foundation v. Commis-
sioner,4 the corporation intentionally priced its product to make a
twenty percent profit. While the profits were substantial, they were all
required to be spent on research furthering the corporation's scientific
purpose. Again, the court found no "commercial purpose."
If an organization can show that the profits are necessary to cover its
own expenses, including reasonable salaries, the presence of profits will
not be determinative. This will be the case especially if the taxpayer
shows that it is unable to obtain income from other sources. 49 For exam-
ple, the taxpayer in Pulpit Resource v. Commissioner,"0 was a corporation
which printed sermons which could be used by people such as ministers,
priests, and rabbis. The corporation's objective was to disseminate ser-
mons to ministers to improve their religious preachings. In upholding the
whether they accomplish one or more exempt purposes. Then we must determine
whether a substantial or insubstantial part of the organization's activities further
nonexempt purposes. If one or more exempt purposes are accomplished by the organ-
ization's primary activities and if an insubstantial part of the organization's activities
are devoted to the accomplishment of non-exempt purposes, then the organization is
operated exclusively for exempt purposes. Note that the presence of profitmaking ac-
tivities is not a per se bar to qualification of an organization as exempt if the activi-
ties further or accomplish an exempt purpose.
Id. at 211.
41 71 T.C. 202 (1978).
4 56 T.C. 147 (1971). The Orton case distinguished other cases in which large profits were
found indicative of a non-exempt purpose by stating:
Fundamental to determinations in those cases that the organizations in question were
not exempt were findings of large profits, substantial accumulations of income, and
relatively small amounts of actual exempt activity. Petitioner, on the other hand, was
not a business of burgeoning profits, and greatly increasing accumulations of income
in relation to distributions.
Id. at 159.
' Of course, if an organization which portends as being charitable is unable to attract dona-
tions and there is substantial accumulation of large profits, you could assume that if the
activity performed by the exempt organization were truly charitable, there would be mem-
bers of the public interested in supporting the entity.
50 70 T.C. 594 (1978).
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exemption, the Tax Court held that the fact that "[the] petitioner in-
tended to make a profit, alone, does not negate that petitioner was oper-
ated exclusively for charitable purposes. "" According to the court,
"[a]pparently the only way petitioner could accomplish its objective of
disseminating sermons to ministers to improve their religious preachings
was by selling Pulpit Resource at a price sufficient to pay for its cost and
provide [its officers] with a reasonable salary. '52
Cases such as Aid to Artisans, Orton, and Pulpit Resource, raise the
question of whether it is appropriate to look at how the profits are used
in determining whether an exemption is appropriate. Arguably, Congress'
rejection of the "destination of income test" in section 502 and its enact-
ment in 1950 of the unrelated business income provisions indicates that
courts should not look at how profits are spent in determining exemption
from taxation.
5 3
. While such an argument raises a close question, the Tax Court's re-
jection of this position appears appropriate. Congress' concern with the
unrelated business income, as with section 502, was to correct what ap-
peared to be the unfair competitive advantage given to non-profit corpo-
rations when competing with for-profit corporations.54 Congress' refusal
to tax income from related trade or business indicated that Congress did
not intend to stifle such activity. In cases such as Aid to Artisans, Orton
and Pulpit Resource, the courts found that the income was from a "re-
lated trade or business." Once that finding is made, the only inquiry
should be whether the taxpayer's officers had a non-substantial commer-
cial purpose. On that narrow issue, it would appear that the corporation's
use of the income is a relevant factor. Accordingly, Congress' rejection of
the destination of income test for purposes of section 502 and for unre-
lated trade or businesses would not be an appropriate basis for precluding
a review of how an exempt organization's profits from a related trade or
business are used.
2. Accumulation of Profits
P&R argued that its accumulation of profits was for the purpose of
expanding its operations and thereby augmenting the dissemination of its
beliefs. Cash on hand reached $417,844 in 1976 before being reduced by
the cost of building its new plant to $208,200 in 1978, and then to
"' Id. at 611.
2 Id. The Tax Court appeared willing to accept the presence of a small profit only because
the taxpayer was able to show that no commercial enterprise would have performed the
activity which the Tax Court had found to fulfill a religious objective.
11 See I.R.C. § 511-513 on related business income. As to the history of these provisions, see
Eliasberg, supra note 24, at 78-81.
" See Elisberg, supra note 24, at 78-81.
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$111,826 in 1979." Apparently, because of the size of the accumulation
and the expansion, the Tax Court rejected P&R's argument that the ac-
cumulation furthered a charitable purpose. The court stated: "[s]uch in-
crease, however, may also be indicative of a commercial enterprise. We
are not convinced that one of the significant reasons for expansion was
not the commercial one of wishing to expand production for profit." 6
No other case has penalized a taxpayer where the taxpayer proffered
a legitimate reason for the accumulation. Probably the most significant
case in which accumulated capital played a role is Scripture Press Foun-
dation v. United States.5 7 The taxpayer in that case "vigorously argue[d]
that its primary interest was to better the Sunday schools of America by
improving both the quality of instruction and the materials used in those
schools. The instructional aspect of this endeavor involved outlays of
monies by the plaintiff."5 " The Court of Appeals reasoned that "it is fair
in making a determination as to what was the most important aspect of
plaintiff's work to compare how much plaintiff accumulated as a result of
its sales of religious literature and how much it expended for instructional
activities." 59 The court found that during the latter years in question the
accumulated capital and surplus exceeded 1.5 million dollars, while ex-
penditures for religious programs were less than $100,000." The court
concluded that "the enormity of the contrast between what plaintiff has
accumulated from sales each year and what it has expended for its educa-
tional programs reveals that the sale of religious literature is its primary
activity and that its instructional phase is incidental thereto.""1 The court
noted that even though the taxpayer had built a new building costing in
excess of one million dollars, that "[elven allowing for the cost of the
building, however, the disparity between amounts actually expended for
instruction when compared with amounts realized in earnings is unac-
countably small.""2
" See 79 T.C. 1070 (1982).
" Id. at 1086.
87 285 F.2d 800 (Ct. Cl. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 985 (1962).
" 285 F.2d at 804. The Scripture Press court stated that the test to be used was whether
the sale of religious literature by the plaintiffs in this case was incidental to the plaintiff's
religious purposes or incidental to the sale of religious literature. Id. at 803-04.
" Id. at 804.
" See id. at 804-05.
" Id.
* Id. at 805.
The Scripture Press court apparently rejected the subjective test adopted by the Third
Circuit in the P&R case. The court held:
The evidence in this case, as is amply borne out by the findings of the trial com-
missioner, shows that throughout its history Scripture Press has been led by people of
devout and intense religious conviction. However, the intensity of the religious con-
victions of the plaintiff's members and officers cannot operate to exempt them from
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A second major case focusing on the accumulation of profits is Incor-
porated Trustees of the Gospel Worker Society v. United States Depart-
ment of Treasury.6" The organization in Gospel Workers sold Sunday
School literature and used the money received to operate a home for eld-
erly women who were part of the society. The taxpayer competed with a
few other non-profit corporations. The material was sold at a profit."'
Gospel Worker's accumulated surplus grew from approximately two mil-
lion dollars through the 1960's to over 5.3 million dollars in 1978. In find-
ing there was no exempt purpose for the accumulation, the district court
held:
While it is theoretically conceivable that a religious purpose may underlie
the enormous accumulation of profits since 1970, the sheer size of the sur-
plus and the lack of anything more concrete than the word of plaintiff's
officers as to its future use militates against such a finding. Even if it be
assumed, arguendo, that the funds now accumulated will eventually be used
for expansion, it would not help plaintiff's case, for the purpose of the ex-
pansion may well be the accumulation of still greater profits. Plaintiff has
given the Court no basis to find otherwise.6 5
The Gospel Worker court was clearly troubled by the failure of the tax-
payer to introduce proof of why it was accumulating the surplus. The
court stated that:
The burden of proof to overcome the grounds set forth by the IRS in its
revocation lies with the plaintiff [footnote omitted] - that is, plaintiff may
overcome the IRS finding that the operation of the Gospel Press is not sub-
stantially related to the performance of an exempt function. Plaintiff has
not sufficiently established a connection between the accumulation of prof-
its and some religious purpose so as to overcome that finding."6
One obvious distinction between cases such as Scripture Press and
the tax law if the activities of the plaintiff cannot in themselves justify such an ex-
emption. Piety is no defense to the assessments of the tax collector.
Id. at 804. Thus, the Scripture Press court seems to be saying that even a religious purpose
will not justify an exemption if the objective facts indicate a possible commercial purpose.
The Scripture Press holding on this point appears particularly wrong since the ultimate
issue here is the taxpayer's motive - a question of the taxpayer's intent assuming charita-
ble purpose is fulfilled.
11 510 F. Supp. 374 (D.D.C. 1981), aff'd mem., 672 F.2d 894 (App. D.C. 1981), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 944 (1982).
64 Id. at 378. The court said that the "critical inquiry is whether petitioner's primary pur-
pose for engaging in its sole activity [trade or business of selling the literature] is an exempt
purpose, or whether its primary purpose is the non-exempt one of operating a commercial
business producing net profits for petitioner." Id. (quoting B.S.W. Group, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 70 T.C. 352. 356 (1978)).
" Id. at 379.
Id. at 379 n.14.
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Gospel Workers and the P&R case is the size of the accumulation. The
P&R accumulation was relatively quite small. Second, the taxpayer in
P&R had demonstrated both a need for expansion (an increased popular-
ity in its books) and the actual carrying out of such expansion. Finally,
neither the Scripture Press nor Gospel Worker courts explained why a
large accumulation was indicative of a commercial purpose. 7
3. Significant Competition With For-Profit Corporations
The P&R Tax Court held that "[a]lso significant is competition with
commercial publishers, deemed to be strong evidence of the predomi-
nance of nonexempt commercial purposes.' ",68 The court felt this factor
weighed against the exemption for P&R. According to the court, the fact
that P&R sold its books to other publishing companies, as well as pur-
chased books from other publishing companies, indicated that such com-
petition existed. Of particular importance to the court was that at least
one P&R author was very popular and could have been published by a
for-profit publisher. From this objective fact the court concluded that the
taxpayer must have had a nonexempt purpose.
Generally, the further the activity is removed from traditional chari-
table, religious or scientific functions, the greater the emphasis will be
placed on whether competition exists. One of the most often cited cases
on this point is B.S. W. Group, Inc. v. Commissioner.6 B.S.W. was formed
for the purpose of providing consulting services pertaining to rural re-
lated policy and program development. The services were priced at
slightly above B.S.W.'s cost.70 In finding that the corporation was non-
exempt, the court held that the "petitioner's activity constitutes the con-
duct of a consulting business of the sort which is ordinarily carried on by
commercial ventures organized for profit .. ."" Similar to the burden
"' See infra notes 55-67 and accompanying text for discussion of Tax Court's treatment of
accumulated earnings.
68 79 T.C. at 1085 (quoting B.S.W. Group, Inc. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. at 358).
69 70 T.C. 352 (1978).
70 The B.S. W. court emphasized the above-cost pricing. It quoted Revenue Ruling 72-369 to
the effect:
Providing managerial and consulting services on a regular basis for a fee is trade
or business ordinarily carried on for profit. The fact that the services in this case are
provided at cost and solely for exempt organizations is not sufficient to characterize
this activity as charitable within the meaning of § 501(c)(3) of the Code. Furnishing
the services at cost lacks the donative element necessary to establish this activity as
charitable.
Id. at 356. The B.S. W. court contrasted Revenue Ruling 71-529 which held that an "organi-
zation providing investment management services to other exempt organizations at substan-
tially below cost is exempt." Id.
"' Id. at 358.
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placed on taxpayers to show that the accumulation of income was for an
exempt purpose, the court placed the burden on the taxpayer to show
that the organization was not in competition with for-profit corporations.
The B.S.W. court held that the "[pletitioner has completely failed to
demonstrate that its own services, or the services performed by its consul-
tants, are not in competition with commercial businesses such as person-
nel agencies, consulting referral services, real estate agents, housing rental
services, banks, loan companies, trash disposal firms or environmental
consulting companies." 2 According to the B.S.W. court, "[clompetition
with commercial firms is strong evidence of the predominance of nonex-
empt commercial purposes. ' 3
The B.S.W. decision is representative of many cases involving less
traditional charitable enterprises. For example, in Federation Pharmacy
Services, Inc. v. Commissioner,74 the Tax Court denied an exemption to a
non-profit corporation that operated a pharmacy selling drugs at cost to
elderly and handicapped persons. The Tax Court supported its finding of
a substantial commercial purpose by noting: "[M]any profit-making orga-
nizations sell at a discount. Nor does the fact that the petitioner seeks to
sell its drugs at cost alter the result; so does an old fashioned cooperative,
yet it is not entitled to classification as charitable. ' '17
In American Institute for Economic Research v. United States,76 the
Court of Claims held that an investment advisory service was not oper-
ated for an educational purpose even though it had set up a fellowship
and scholarship program. The court reasoned that the products sold by
the organization were of a commercial type and that the people who were
making payments to the corporations were paying for a desired service,
thus rendering it difficult to view the payments as "charitable contribu-
" Id. The B.S.W. court held that the following factors are to be considered in determining
whether or not the purpose of a non-profit corporation's trade or business is commercial or
non-commercial: 1. the particular manner in which an organization's activities are con-
ducted; 2. the commercial hue of those activities; and 3. the existence and amount of annual
or accumulated profits. Id. at 357.
It is not sufficient to characterize this activity as charitable within the meaning of §
501(c)(3). This group does not resemble the framework which is typical of a § 501(c)(3)
organization in that it neither solicited nor received voluntary contributions from the public
and its fees for services were set above cost, although maybe lower than that of other firms.
73 Id. at 358.
7' 72 T.C. 687 (1979), aff'd, 625 F.2d 804 (8th Cir. 1980).
15 Id. at 692. The dissent in Federation was willing to ignore the competition with for-profit
corporations by noting that the taxpayer did not sell items related directly to health care
and normally sold by pharmacies for profits nor did it advertise. Id. at 698. The dissent also
noted that unlike a commercial enterprise, the taxpayer depended upon the services of vol-
unteers to continue operating.
76 302 F.2d 934 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
30 CATHOLIC LAWYER, SPRING, 1986
tions"(since they were purchasing a commercial-type good)." The AlE
court held:
In order for plaintiff to obtain its "contributions," it must proffer something
valuable in return. This necessity or purpose to provide such information
and service as would be desired by the public places plaintiff in competition
with other commercial organizations providing similar services. Plaintiff has
chosen to compete in this manner and, as a consequence, plaintiff's activi-
ties acquire a commercial hue.78
In contrast to cases such as B.S.W., Federation and AIE, the courts
have allowed an exemption to what would otherwise appear to be com-
mercial establishments where the taxpayer establishes its uniqueness. For
example, in Goldsboro Art League, Inc. v. Commissioner7 9 the taxpayer
operated two commercial art galleries, as well as carrying on other educa-
tional work. The taxpayer selected paintings for distribution at the gal-
leries and upon their sale provided eighty percent of the proceeds to the
artist and twenty percent was maintained to defray expenses. The IRS
argued that since the taxpayer operated like any other commercial gal-
lery, the evidence indicated that the sales activity was an end in itself
rather than a means of accomplishing an exempt purpose. While acknowl-
edging that the taxpayer apparently appeared to operate like any other
commercial gallery, the court felt that other factors overrode the indicia
of a commercial purpose. One of the most important factors, according to
the court, was that there was no other art gallery in the area."0
In Peoples Translation Service v. Commissioner,8 the taxpayer pub-
lished a magazine containing translations from foreign publications. Gen-
erally, the taxpayer operated in many respects like other commercial pub-
lishers. In finding that the taxpayer was an exempt organization, however,
the Tax Court focused primarily on the fact that the organization did not
compete with other publishers, that it maintained a library open to the
public and it translated material for scholars not otherwise available to
scholars at no cost. In addition, the subscription rate for the taxpayer's
magazine was below cost. 82 On this basis the Tax Court held that the
" Id. at 938 ("It is obvious that the service offered by plaintiff is one commonly associated
with a commercial enterprise.").
78 Id.
79 75 T.C. 337 (1980).
" Id. at 344. Among the other factors considered by the court was: 1. that the members of
the board of the taxpayer had various professions and were not making their incomes solely
from the organization; 2. that the organization provided educational classes; 3. that the gal-
leries had permanent collections which were not for sale; and 4. that the organization relied
heavily on volunteers, although it did have some paid employees.
61 72 T.C. 42 (1979).
8" On the issue of below-cost pricing, the Peoples Translation Court held:
Both this Court and the Commissioner have recognized, however, that providing
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organization was fulfilling an exempt purpose even though it otherwise
resembled a commercial operation.
Finally, in the Edward Orton, Jr., Ceramic Foundation v. Commis-
sioner case,8 3 discussed supra, the taxpayer was in direct competition
with other pyrometric cone producers. In finding that the corporation was
exempt, the court focused on the amount of income which was used to
provide scholarships and otherwise fund research in the pyrometric cone
field.8 4
4. Affiliation With Traditional Exempt Organization
The Tax Court in P&R considered it significant that the taxpayer
was "not affiliated or controlled by any particular church organiza-
tion .".,86 According to the Tax Court "this non-denominational charac-
ter 'contributes to the resemblance between its publishing activities and
those of commercial, non-exempt publishers of Christian literature with
whom . . . [i]t competes.' "s
This "affiliation" factor has been considered important in many
cases. It appears to be the primary distinction between those religious
publishing company cases in which an exemption was upheld and those
where it was denied.
St. Germain Foundation v. Commissioner8 7 was the first major case
on this point. In St. Germain, the taxpayer's organizers had established
the "I am" religion. The primary precept of this religion was the existence
and relationship of God-self in each individual, and that the "mighty I
am presence" is a source of all life. A primary activity of the taxpayer was
the sale of religious literature to be used in the dissemination of its be-
liefs. However, the corporation also ran classes at which the religion's
principles were taught. Unlike a strictly commercial enterprise, the reli-
gion also received substantial contributions from believers. On the basis
of this close affiliation between the religion espoused by the taxpayer and
services or publications at prices below cost is a factor to be taken into account. In
B.S.W. Group, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra at 359, the Court pointed out that "it
does not appear that petitioner ever plans to charge a fee less than 'cost'." In Rev.
Rul. 72-369, 1972-2 C.B. 245, 246, the Commissioner stated that "Furnishing the ser-
vices at cost lacks the donative element necessary to establish this activity as charita-
ble" and distinguished the case of a similar organization on the ground that its fees
were "substantially less than cost."
Id. at 50.
83 56 T.C. 147 (1971).
" Id. at 159.
85 79 T.C. at 1086.
86 Id. at 1086 citing Incorporated Trustees of Gospel Worker Society v. United States, 510
F. Supp. at 379 n.16.
87 26 T.C. 648 (1956).
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the sale of literature, the Tax Court upheld the exemption reasoning:
The sale of religious literature and the conclaves held to propagate the
precepts of the petitioner are activities closely associated with, and inciden-
tal to, the religious purposes of the petitioner. Such activities bear an inti-
mate relationship to the proper functioning of the petitioner, and we do not
believe that income received from these activities prevents the petitioner
from being an organization organized and operated "exclusively" for reli-
gious purposes within the meaning of § 101(6).18
The type of affiliation required by P&R, as exemplified by St.
Germain, is very formal. Merely espousing the use of a particular religion
appears to be insufficient since P&R was "affiliated" with the Orthodox
Presbyterian Church in terms of its philosophy.
The Tax Court's rejection of this informal affiliation is supported by
Fides Publishers Association v. United States."" The goal of the taxpayer
in Fides was the active participation of Catholic laymen in the affairs of
the church which, until the time of the case, was completely dominated
by the clergy. Fides published numerous books admittedly religious in
nature. Although the organization's principal officer was on the faculty of
the University of Notre Dame, the taxpayer was independent of the insti-
tution as well as the local Catholic diocese. Because Fides did not itself
constitute a church, nor was it affiliated with a church, the court reasoned
that it could not find the organization exempt:
The exemption can only be denied ... if the taxpayer is being operated for
some non-exempt purpose which is substantial in nature. Such a purpose
does exist. It may be described as the publication and sale of religious liter-
ature at a profit. In effect, the sole activity of Fides defines at least one
purpose for which it is operated. It could not be otherwise. If it were, every
publishing house would be entitled to an exemption on the ground that it
furthers the education of the public.9 0
While the court accepted the taxpayer's sincerity in its belief that it was
furthering its religious goals, the court considered this fact irrelevant in
light of the substantial nature of Fides' trade or business.9 '
Finally, the Tax Court expressed a similar view in Christian Manner
International, Inc. v. Commissioner,92 in which the taxpayer was organ-
'B Id. at 658.
89 263 F. Supp. 924 (N.D. Ind. 1967).
90 Id. at 935. The Fides Court relied on Scripture Press Found. v. United States, 285 F.2d
800 (Ct. CI. 1961).
0' 263 F. Supp. 924 (N.D. Ind. 1967). The Fides Court held that "[T]o deny that Fides, an
independent, profit-making publisher of specialized literature, is operated for a business
purpose, is to avoid reality. Having no other function, that purpose must be ascribed to it
notwithstanding sincere disclaimers of any such intent." Id. at 936.
-- 71 T.C. 661 (1979).
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ized by a writer of Christian books. The taxpayer's books were generally
sold at a profit. Christian Manner argued that an exemption was required
because its purpose in publishing the books was primarily to further
Christian beliefs. Noting that the case was similar to Scripture Press
Foundation and Fides, the court found that the taxpayer's sole purpose
was commercial.
5. Other Indicia of Commercial Purpose
The Tax Court found that P&R's conscious attempt to transform it-
self into "a more mainline commercial enterprise" showed that it no
longer had a substantial exempt purpose. Among the factors listed were:
"it searched out more readers; it employed paid workers; it dropped
money-losing plans; it paid substantial royalties; it made formal contracts
with some authors; and, of course, it expanded into a new facility from
which it could continue to reap profits."93 The Tax Court's criticism of
P&R for its attempt to operate efficiently appears especially inappropri-
ate. If a taxpayer is operating for a legitimate exempt purpose, it should
not be denied the exemption merely because it is operating in such a way
as to maximize its effectiveness. In fact, in many cases involving what are
apparently traditional commercial enterprises, the Tax Court has upheld
exemption without an analysis of the efficiency of the taxpayer's opera-
tion. For example, in the Orton case,94 every indication was that the tax-
payer was operating in such a way as to maximize earnings. In fact, in
none of the recent cases in which the exemption has been upheld has the
court found that the taxpayer was not operating efficiently in support of
its holding.
III.
THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S ANALYSIS
The Third Circuit described the issue in the P&R case as being "at
what point should successful operation of a tax exempt organization be
deemed to have transformed that organization into a commercial enter-
prise and thereby to have forfeited its tax exemption."9 5 Without being
specific, the Court of Appeals first criticized as inflexible the Tax Court's
reliance solely upon objective facts. It concluded that "it is doubtful that
any small-scaled exempt operation could ever increase its economic activ-
ity without forfeiting its tax exempt status under such a definition of
non-exempt commercial character" [i.e., the accumulation of capital,
• Id. at 1086.
See Orton v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 147 (1971).
" 84-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) I 9764 at p. 85,252.
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profitability and efficient operation]." The court then proposed the fol-
lowing test: "We believe that the statutory inclusion or exclusion of P&R
should be considered under a two prong test: first, what is the purpose of
an organization claiming tax exempt status; and, second, to whose benefit
does its activity inure? '97
A review of'the Third Circuit's test as applied to the P&R situation
shows it to be virtually identical to that applied by the Tax Court - the
only distinction being the conclusion drawn by the Court of Appeals from
the same objective facts focused on by the Tax Court.
A. Private Inurement
The first part of the Third Circuit's analysis requires a determination
of whether any part of an organization's net earnings inure to the benefit
of any private shareholder or individual. The court relied upon Treasury
Regulations to the effect that an organization is not operated exclusively
for one or more exempt purposes if its net earnings inure in whole or in
part to the benefit of private shareholders or individuals."8
The Third Circuit"s emphasis on private inurement is not novel. In
fact, virtually all the prior decisions in this area discuss the salary and
expenses received by the officers. Such cases do not discuss the issue in
terms of "private inurement" but whether or not the excessive salaries
and expenses show that the organization had a "commercial purpose"
rather than an exempt one.
For example, in Incorporated Trustees of the Gospel Worker Society
v. United States,s9 a significant reason why the court found the organiza-
tion's sale of religious literature to be non-exempt was the fact that a
primary officer's salary had increased from $25,000 in 1970 to over
$100,000 in 1978. In contrast, in St. Germain Foundation v. Commis-
sioner,100 and Pulpit Resource v. Commissioner,"0 ' the courts noted the
reasonable salary and expenses to justify a finding of an exemption.'0 2
mId.
Id. at 85,252. The Third Circuit held that its two-part test was supported by the legisla-
tive history of § 501(c)(3). The court quoted Senator Bacon, the sponsor of the bill. Id.
98 Id. at 85,252-54 (citing Treasury Regulation § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2) stating that where indi-
vidual officers of an organization receive excessive salaries or expenses, private inurement
exists). In P&R, the most highly paid officer, Bryce Craig, received just over $15,000. None
of the other seven employees received salaries over $12,000 and, in fact, five were paid under
$6,250. The Third Circuit considered such salaries reasonable.
" 510 F. Supp. 374 (D.D.C. 1981), aff'd, 672 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
944 (1982).
'00 26 T.C. 648 (1956).
101 70 T.C. 594 (1978).
o But see B.S.W. Group, Inc. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 352 (1978) and Fides Publishers
Ass'n v. United States, 263 F. Supp. 924 (N.D. Ind. 1967) where the courts refused to hold
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B. Third Circuit's Purpose Test
The court next turned to the second prong of its test: what is the
taxpayer's true purpose? Although critical of the wholly objective nature
of the Tax Court's purpose test, the Third Circuit failed to articulate a
clear alternative. To the contrary, it appears to concede the validity of
the Tax Court's approach while at the same time rejecting its conclusions.
Like the Tax Court, the Third Circuit held that the ultimate ques-
tion of fact is whether the officers of P&R had a substantial non-exempt
motive. 0 3 Nevertheless, in order to resolve this question of intent, the
Court of Appeals relied upon the same evaluation of objective facts as
proposed by the Tax Court:' "
The Tax Court properly framed the inquiry as to whether P&R's purpose
was within § 501(c)(3) as follows: where non-exempt purpose is not an ex-
pressed goal, courts have focused on the manner in which the activities
themselves are carried on, implicitly reasoning that an end can be inferred
for the chosen means. 08
Thus, the Third Circuit leaves the impression that while the Tax Court's
approach was "inflexible," it could not develop a better method. Instead,
the Circuit Court merely rejected the conclusions reached by the Tax
Court based on the same objective facts.
that the payment of little or no salary to the taxpayer's officers indicated a non-exempt
purpose.
"' 84-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9764 at 85,254. Although not particularly clear, it appears
that the Third Circuit may take a more lenient view than the Tax Court as to whether an
exemption is available as long as the "primary" purpose is exempt. The Circuit Court ap-
pears to say that the Supreme Court's Better Business "single non-exempt purpose" may be
limited to the facts of that case where the taxpayer had explicitly expressed a non-exempt
purpose. Id.
'o Id. The Court of Appeals supported its use of objective facts to show subjective intent by
citing Griffin v. County School Board, 377 U.S. 218 (1964). In Griffin, the plaintiffs chal-
lenged a Virginia County's closing of its public schools. The Supreme Court held that the
County's intent was to maintain an illegally segregated school system. Unlike P&R, there
was no viable legitimate purpose to offset the likelihood that the defendant had an inappro-
priate motive for its actions.
It is questionable whether Griffin supports the Tax Court's and Third Circuit's focus on
objective facts. The Griffin decision is properly limited to those cases where, under the cir--
cumstances, an improper motive can be presumed. That is, as in Griffin, the approach is
limited to those instances where an improper intent is the most likely case. Where a legiti-
mate motive is just as likely as an illicit one, Griffin is inapposite. In the context of a non-
profit corporation, if it is found that the corporate officers truly believe they are acting to
further a legitimate exempt purpose of objective facts which could show an alternative pur-
pose although not inconsistent with the taxpayer's exempt purpose, the application of Grif-
fin is erroneous.
00 84-2 U.S. Tax Cas.(CCH) 9764 at 85,254.
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1. P&R's Accumulation of Income
The Court of Appeals first questioned the Tax Court's treatment of
P&R's accumulation of income. According to the Third Circuit, P&R's
notification to the IRS that it was accumulating funds to purchase or
build an office and warehouse supported the taxpayer's contention that
the accumulation was for a legitimate purpose. The Court of Appeals
supported its conclusion by citing the accumulated earnings tax provi-
sions'06 which specifically allow a corporation to accumulate earnings in
order to "provide for bona fide expansion of business or replacement of a
plant . .. .""'
The Third Circuit's rejection of the Tax Court's emphasis on the fact
of accumulation was warranted. Internal Revenue Code Section 511
clearly indicates that an exempt organization can earn profits not subject
to income tax where it is generated by a related trade or business. Once it
is accepted that profits can be generated by an exempt organization, it
necessarily follows that such an organization can accumulate that profit,
especially if the purpose of the accumulation is to ultimately further the
exempt purposes of -the organization. Thus, a legitimate question exists as
to whether accumulation of profit should be treated as an indicia of a
commercial purpose at all.
If accumulation has any relevance, it is as to whether the officers are
sincere in their desire to accomplish the organization's exempt purpose.
For example, if an organization's purpose is to disseminate the principle
of a particular religion, a large accumulation of profits which could be
used to further that purpose, may indicate that the organization's officers
are not sincere in their belief. However, if it is clear from other facts that
the officers are in fact sincere, and there is no evidence of private inure-
ment offsetting the evidence of the sincerity, any explanation for the ac-
cumulation as furthering an exempt purpose should suffice to dispel
whatever indicia of a commercial purpose might be indicated.0 s Any
other rule requires a circular determination of whether the taxpayer's rea-
son for the accumulation shows a commercial purpose (the Service having
26 U.S.C. § 531, et seq. (1982).
107 84-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9764 at 85,256 quoting 26 C.F.R. § 1.537-2(b)(1) (1984). The
Third Circuit's reliance on the cumulative earnings tax provision is questionable. The pur-
pose of that provision is to prevent individuals from not distributing earnings in order to
avoid the taxation on the dividends. Such a provision is inapposite to the issue here, which
is whether or not the accumulation shows that the taxpayer's purpose in earning profits was
commercial rather than non-exempt.
08 Arguably, if an exempt organization carrying on a trade or business has generated sub-
stantial profits it should lower the prices for its goods. See P&R, 79 T.C. at 1085. However,
the Tax Court should not be in the position of second-guessing the decision of corporate
officers who sincerely believe they are fulfilling an exempt purpose in the best manner
possible.
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originally argued that the accumulation itself showed a commercial pur-
pose). Presumably, to resolve this latter issue one must look at the other
indicia of commercial purpose - the same issue as the trier of fact was
required to resolve originally. 10 9
2. Affiliation With Traditional Exempt Organization
'The Third Circuit also rejected the Tax Court's treatment of the fact
that P&R was not formally affiliated with any church. According to the
Third Circuit, the informal affiliation with OPC should have been found
sufficient. The court relied on Fides Publishers Association v. United
States,1 0 in holding that "the denominational or non-denominational
character of an organization has never been a controlling criterion."
The Third Circuit's reliance on Fides was misplaced since in Fides
itself there was only an informal affiliation with the Catholic church (as
there was between P&R and OPC) and the court found that the organiza-
tion was not exempt. Nevertheless, the Third Circuit's treatment of the
affiliation issue is correct since the organization seeking an exemption is
doing so based upon its own activities and not that of another exempt
organization. 1 ' The only issue should be whether the taxpayer itself is
fulfilling an exempt purpose. This has been recognized by the Tax Court
in numerous opinions, such as Pulpit Resource'1 2 and Orton,"' where
there was not even an informal affiliation with a more traditional exempt
organization.
The affiliation issue should be discussed in conjunction with the com-
petition issue. Affiliation is relevant only to the extent it lends support to
a taxpayer's contention that it has an exempt purpose. In cases such as
Scripture Press,"" where the organization was a bona fide religion, it is
easy to accept that the dissemination of the organization's material is for
exempt purpose (i.e., furthering the religious goals of the organization).
When there is no affiliation, however, the question becomes how to distin-
guish between a typical commercial publisher of religious material and an
organization claiming an exempt purpose. In fact, it was just on this basis
that the Fides Court rejected the organization's claim that it was an ex-
For example, in P&R the Tax Court concluded that P&R's purpose behind expanding
was the nonexempt one of selling religious literature at a profit. See P&R, 79 T.C. at 1087.
The only way to resolve the dispute was to make the same determination as if the court had
not discussed the accumulation issue.
263 F. Supp. 924 (N.D. Ind. 1967).
.' Compare feeder organizations under 26 U.S.C. § 502.
Pulpit Resource v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 594 (1978).
Orton v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 147 (1971).
Scripture Press Found. v. United States, 285 F.2d 800 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 985
(1962).
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empt organization."' It is in this light that the connection to the competi-
tion issue becomes clear.
If the taxpayer can show that no commercial publisher publishes the
same material as that of the exempt organization and that the material
furthers the organization's exempt purpose, affiliation with another ex-
empt organization should be unnecessary. That is, where there is no affili-
ation, the issue should be whether the exempt organization is filling a
void left unfilled by the marketplace. If competition is present, and there
is no affiliation, it would be difficult to distinguish the organization from
other commercial publishers. In such cases, denial of the exemption
would appear warranted absent other evidence, such as proof of the per-
formance of substantial non-commercial activities.
3. Other Factors
Once the Third Circuit concluded that accumulation of profits and
lack of affiliation were inappropriate objective factors for determining
that P&R had a commercial motive, it reasoned that the remaining fac-
tors supported an exemption. The court apparently considered unpersua-
sive: (1) that P&R competed with commercial publishers; (2) that it had
to pay royalties to its authors; (3) that it would not publish a book which
would not sell; (4) that there was little public contribution to the organi-
zation; 1 and (5) that it did not decrease the price of its popular books so
as to increase the dissemination of its belief. The Third Circuit gives little
guidance as to why these factors did not support the Tax Court's
conclusion.
4. Success of P&R
The Third Circuit's failure to analyze the other factors raised by the
Tax Court probably reflects that court's belief that the Tax Court was
primarily concerned with P&R's recent success. In essence, the Third Cir-
cuit held that the Tax Court was unjustly penalizing P&R for its success
in fostering a growing acceptance of its religious principle. To this extent
the Third Circuit's holding was primarily grounded on public policy: if
individuals with minority religious or philosophical views work within the
context of an exempt organization and their views begin to gain wide
public support, the result should not be the loss of tax-exempt status.
"1 263 F. Supp. 924, 934 (N.D. Ind. 1967)(the taxpayer failed to distinguish itself from
commercial publishers).
"' It would seem that if an organization is fulfilling a charitable, religious or educational
role, that there would be members of the public willing to support the organization. It is
noteworthy, however, that even though P&R received little public financial support, it did
have a partially volunteer staff. 79 T.C. at 1086.
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As stated by the Third Circuit:
Our concern is that organizations seeking section 501(c)(3) status may be
forced to choose between expanding their audience and influence on the one
hand, and maintaining their tax-exempt status on the other. If this were a
stagnant society in which various ideas and creeds preserve a hold on a
fixed proportion of the population, this concern would evaporate. A large
religious institution with a broad base of support, such as one of the more
established churches, could be the springboard for large-scale publishing
houses dedicated to advancing its doctrines and be assured of qualifying for
§ 501(c)(3) coverage. A small denomination, such as the OPC, could then
have within its penumbra only a small-scale operation run off a kitchen ta-
ble. In such circumstances, any attempt by a publisher adhering to the
views of small denomination to expand its scope of activities would properly
raise questions relating to its continued eligibility for tax-exempt status. 1 11
While such a holding may be sound policy, it provides little guidance in
the more typical case.
IV.
PROPOSED TEST
The Third Circuit criticized the Tax Court on the basis that the Tax
Court's test would lead to "ad hoc decisions." The Third Circuit appar-
ently believed that a test focusing just on objective facts could cause the
denial of an exemption to organizations whose purposes truly were ex-
empt (as the court presumably felt P&R's was). Nevertheless, the Third
Circuit fails to articulate any better analytical approach.
From the foregoing analysis of the precedent in this area, including
the standards set forth by the Tax Court and Third Circuit in P&R, the
following test appears appropriate for determining whether section
501(c)(3) is available to a taxpayer whose primary activity is the carrying
on of a trade or business.
The first issue should be whether or not the taxpayer's organizers
and officers sincerely believe that their operation of the organization is
primarily for fulfilling an exempt purpose and that such a purpose is be-
ing fulfilled." 8 In this context, the private inurement test of the Third
Circuit in P&R should be considered. While numerous court cases have
held that such officers' sincerity is irrelevant to the issue of determining
exempt status, those cases appear to be at odds with the express language
"7 84-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 19764 at 85,257.
10 For example, in the P&R case, the first step in the analysis would be to determine
whether the organization's officers truly believed they were fulfilling a religious purpose
without regard to any other objective factors. In this regard the officers' religious training
and work with OPC would be relevant.
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of the statute. Section 501(c)(3) is based upon the "purposes" of the or-
ganizers of an exempt corporation and not its "activities." If it is found
that the members of the organization sincerely believe that they are fur-
thering an exempt purpose, and their purpose is one of those which al-
lows for exemption under the statute, there should be a presumption that
section 501(c)(3) applies.119
The second part of the analysis should be to determine which of the
objective factors relied upon by the Tax Court are present. The burden
should be on the Internal Revenue Service to identify which objective
factors it believes shows a non-exempt purpose. For example, if the Ser-
vice contends that the organization competes with commercial enter-
prises, it must produce evidence that such competition exists.
Third, for each factor that is present, the taxpayer must produce evi-
dence'showing why that factor does not diminish its exempt purpose. The
taxpayer's burden here should merely be one of production with the bur-
den of proof remaining on the Service. For example, where there are prof-
its, the taxpayer should be required to produce proof showing that this
profit is necessary if it is going to generate income sufficient to carry out
its exempt purpose. That is, it must show an inability to obtain voluntary
contributions of enough size to continue its operations at the level reason-
able in light of the nature of its activity and the amount of public inter-
est. If there is a significant amount of accumulated earnings (and there is
a legitimate question whether this fact should be considered at all), the
taxpayer must produce evidence showing the purpose for the accumula-
tion. For example, in the case of P&R, accumulation was necessary for
the purchase of a building. In this regard, documentation of the plans (as
necessary in the accumulated earnings tax context) would be relevant evi-
dence. The taxpayer should also produce evidence showing that there is a
need for the expansion (i.e., that there is sufficient public interest to jus-
tify the expansion). Where the taxpayer is not affiliated (formally or in-
formally) with a traditional exempt organization (i.e., a church), the tax-
payer must introduce evidence that a for-profit corporation does not fill
the same role as that of the reported exempt organization. For example, if
no commercial organization were willing to undertake the translation of
foreign newspapers, as was the case in the Peoples Translation case, the
lack of affiliation of the exempt organization with an educational institu-
tion would be acceptable. On the other hand, when an author writes reli-
gious tracts which are able to be sold for a profit, the lack of affiliation
may be determinative of a commercial purpose. Of course, the more an
"9 Although not clearly expressed in the Third Circuit's opinion, the court was apparently
concerned that taxpayers with sincere and legitimate motives were being excluded by the
Tax Court's focus just on objective facts. Such concern is implicit in the court's discussion
of the difficulty in determining a corporate body's nature.
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organization performs exempt functions other than those associated with
the carrying on of a trade or business, the less need there should be for
evidence of no alternative in the market place since the main reason for
considering affiliation is to distinguish the exempt organization from a
commercial enterprise performing similar services (i.e., a commercial pub-
lisher of religious books).
Once the taxpayer has introduced evidence to show why each of the
objective factors does not diminish its exempt purpose, the burden should
be on the IRS to prove that the reasons proffered by the taxpayer were
mere pretext. This is essentially what the Third Circuit held in rejecting
the Tax Court's reliance upon the accumulated earnings of P&R.
Such a test best compares with the language and purpose of section
501(c)(3) while still assuring that the Section will be unavailable to orga-
nizations whose ordinary goal is commercial.
